Re X and Y (Revocation of Adoption Orders)

This case concerned an application to revoke adoption orders for two children, X and Y, aged 17 and 16 respectively, brought by their adoptive mother, AM.

TLDR:

• Application to revoke adoption orders for two children, X and Y.
• The court examined whether it had the power to revoke the orders under inherent jurisdiction or statutory provisions.
• The application was ultimately refused due to lack of power to revoke on welfare grounds.
• Both children were allowed to change their surnames to their birth mother's surname.

The applicant, AM, the adoptive mother of X and Y, sought to revoke the adoption orders due to the breakdown of the adoption placement. Both children had expressed a desire to live with their birth mother, BM, and had been living with her for a significant period. The application raised complex legal questions about the court's power to revoke adoption orders under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court or under s.31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (MFPA).

The court considered the factual background, noting that X and Y were placed for adoption in 2010 and had significant contact with their birth mother during their foster care period. The adoption placement with AM faced challenges, and the children struggled to understand why they could not spend time with their birth family. Over time, both children expressed a desire to live with BM, leading to the current application.

During the hearing, the court examined whether it had the power to revoke the adoption orders. Mr. Dorian Day, representing AM, argued that the court had inherent jurisdiction to revoke the orders or could do so under s.31F(6) of the MFPA. The court also considered the public policy implications of revoking adoption orders, which are intended to be permanent and irrevocable.

The court reviewed relevant case law, including Re B (Adoption: Jurisdiction to Set Aside) [1995] and Webster v Norfolk County Council [2009], which emphasized the finality and permanence of adoption orders. The court noted that revocation could only be considered in highly exceptional and very particular circumstances, typically involving a fundamental breach of natural justice or procedural irregularity.

In this case, the court found no procedural irregularity or fundamental breach of natural justice. The application was based solely on welfare grounds, which did not meet the high threshold established by previous case law. The court concluded that it did not have the power to revoke the adoption orders on welfare grounds alone.

However, the court acknowledged the distress and confusion experienced by the children due to their legal status. While it could not revoke the adoption orders, the court granted the children permission to change their surnames to their birth mother's surname, recognizing the importance of their sense of identity and emotional well-being.

Legal representatives: Mr. Dorian Day and Ms. Samantha Smith for the Applicant, Ms. Elisabeth Richards for the First Respondent, Mr. Timothy Bowe KC and Mr. Mark Cooper-Hall for the Third and Fourth Respondents, Mr. Nick Brown for the Fifth Respondent.

Judicial Panel: Mrs. Justice Lieven

Case Citation Reference: [2024] EWHC 1059 (Fam)