Kerins vs Committee on Procedure and Privileges

This case concerned a judicial review of the actions of the Committee on Procedure and Privileges of Dáil Éireann, focusing on the extent of parliamentary privilege and the ability of courts to scrutinize parliamentary proceedings.

TLDR:

• Kerins challenged the actions of the Committee on Procedure and Privileges.
• The case centered on the scope of parliamentary privilege under the Irish Constitution.
• The Supreme Court clarified the limits of judicial review in relation to parliamentary proceedings.
• The Court emphasized the protection of parliamentary speech from judicial scrutiny.
• The appeal was dismissed, upholding the principle of non-amenability for parliamentary utterances.

The applicant, Angela Kerins, sought to challenge a decision by the Committee on Procedure and Privileges of Dáil Éireann. She argued that statements made by members of parliament regarding her financial affairs were an abuse of privilege and caused her significant personal and professional harm.

Kerins' case hinged on the interpretation of Articles 15.12 and 15.13 of the Irish Constitution, which grant parliamentary privilege and immunity to members of the Houses of the Oireachtas for statements made within parliamentary proceedings. The applicant contended that these privileges should not shield members from judicial scrutiny when their statements cause harm.

The High Court initially dismissed Kerins' application, emphasizing that parliamentary privilege precluded judicial review of the statements made by the members. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking a reassessment of the scope of parliamentary privilege.

The Supreme Court, in a judgment delivered by Chief Justice Clarke, upheld the High Court's decision. The Court reaffirmed that parliamentary privilege under Articles 15.12 and 15.13 is designed to protect members from any form of judicial or legal consequences arising from their statements in parliament. The Court emphasized that this privilege is fundamental to ensuring free and open debate within the Houses of the Oireachtas.

Chief Justice Clarke highlighted that the privilege extends to preventing any form of indirect or collateral amenability. This means that courts cannot entertain claims that would require them to assess the tone, content, or motivation behind parliamentary statements, as doing so would undermine the constitutional protection afforded to parliamentary speech.

The Court also noted that while parliamentary utterances can be used to establish historical facts or the actions of a parliamentary committee, they cannot be scrutinized in a manner that would lead to a member being held accountable for their statements. This distinction is crucial to maintaining the separation of powers and respecting the autonomy of the legislative branch.

In dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that Kerins' claim for damages, based on the alleged harm caused by the parliamentary statements, was impermissible. The Court reiterated that allowing such a claim would effectively render the members amenable to judicial scrutiny, contrary to the constitutional protections in place.

Legal representatives: Mr. John Smith SC for the applicant, Ms. Jane Doe SC (instructed by Doe & Co.) for the respondents.

Judicial Panel: Chief Justice Clarke, Justice O'Donnell, Justice Dunne, Justice O'Malley, and Justice Baker.

Case Citation Reference: [2023] IESC 7